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COLLOQUY
A Case Against Automatic Disbarment
By ABRAHAM ABRAMOVSKY*
"Disbarment being the very serious business that it is, ample op-
portunity must be afforded to show cause why an accused practi-
tioner should be not disbarred."'
Introduction
The disciplinary process, in essence, has two primary goals.2 First,
the appropriate authorities, whether they be called the Grievance Com-
mittee or Disciplinary Committee, attempt to protect the public from
unscrupulous or otherwise unsavory attorneys. Concomitantly, these
administrative bodies seek to penalize behavior that is deemed to be in
contravention of the Code of Professional Responsibility.4 The spectrum
of the disciplinary remedies usually ranges from private reprimand to
public censure; from suspension to the ultimate punishment of disbar-
ment.5 Illustrative of this process is New York's disciplinary system.6
* Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law. B.A. City University of New
York (Queens); J.D. State University of New York (Buffalo); L.L.M., J.S.D. Columbia
University.
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1. Theard v. United States, 354 U.S. 278, 282 (1957).
2. See generally Middlesex County Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass'n, 457 U.S.
423 (1982); In re Ruffalo, 390 U.S. 544 (1968); Theard v. United States, 354 U.S. 278 (1957);
Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333, 380 (1867).
3. Ruffalo, 390 U.S. at 550.
4. Id. at 555.
5. STANDARDS FOR LAWYER DISCIPLINE AND DISABILrrY PROCEEDINGS §§ 6.1 - 6.10
(1979).
6. See N.Y. JUD. LAW § 90 (McKinney 1983). In New York, lawyers are admitted to
practice and disciplined by New York's four Appellate Divisions. See 22 N.Y.C.R.R. § 603
(Ist Dept.); 22 N.Y.C.R.R. § 691 (2d Dept.); 22 N.Y.C.R.R. § 806 (3d Dept.); 22 N.Y.C.R.R.
§ 1022 (4th Dept.). For purposes of this Article, procedures used in the First Department,
which covers Manhattan and the Bronx, will be cited.
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In New York, a lawyer who comes close to violating a disciplinary
rule customarily receives a letter of caution. 7 The letter is sent to attor-
neys whose actions, though technically violating no disciplinary rule, are
nonetheless inconsistent with the duties of competency and veracity that
are required of members of the bar.8 If an attorney's conduct contra-
venes a particular disciplinary rule, the state disciplinary committee may
recommend five possible levels of penalty.9
The least severe punishment is a letter of admonition, wherein the
state disciplinary committee determines that the attorney has violated
one of the state's disciplinary rules. 1° A second level of punishment ap-
plies to more serious cases. The committee, following a hearing, may
issue a private reprimand to a lawyer who has violated the Code of Pro-
fessional Responsibility."l Admonitions and reprimands place the attor-
ney on notice that any future behavior will result in further, probably
more severe, disciplinary action."2 The next level of punitive action is
public censure.13 Public censure ordinarily results from cases of attorney
neglect, in which unethical conduct is mitigated by the particular facts at
bar."' Public censure consists of publication of the charges against the
attorney and the supporting facts in the state's official reporters and in a
local legal newspaper. The rationale for this procedure is both specific
and general deterrence." The fourth level of penalty may result if an
attorney's conduct seriously contravenes a disciplinary rule. At this
level, the attorney may be suspended for one, two or even five years.' 6
The epitome of the disciplinary process is disbarment, the highest
level of disciplinary action. Disbarment strikes the attorney from the
rolls of the state's practicing attorneys and, in effect, terminates his legal
career.17 Although technically a disbarred attorney may petition for re-
instatement after seven years, the petition is rarely granted. Even if the
petition is approved, the attorney starts his legal career de novo, with the
7. 22 N.Y.C.R.R. § 603.9(c) (Ist Dept.).
8. Id.
9. N.Y. JUD. LAW § 90.2 (McKinney 1983); 22 N.Y.C.R.R. § 603.9(c).
10. 22 N.Y.C.R.R. § 603.9(a).
11. Id.
12. 22 N.Y.C.R.R. § 603.9(b).
13. See N.Y. JUD. LAW § 90 (McKinney 1983).
14. See, e.g., In re Weldon, 94 A.D.2d 327, 465 N.Y.S.2d 79 (1983); In re Knapp, 89
A.D.2d 419, 455 N.Y.S.2d 438 (1982); In re Koch, 77 A.D.2d 486, 433 N.Y.S.2d 819 (1980);
In re Weiss, 54 A.D.2d 78, 387 N.Y.S.2d 575 (1976); In re Reifschneider, 60 A.D. 478, 69
N.Y.S. 1069 (1901).
15. In re Refschneider, 60 A.D. 478, 69 N.Y.S. 1069 (1901).
16. N.Y. JUD. LAW § 90.2 (McKinney 1983).
17. Id.
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mark of Cain inscribed prominently on his letterhead.18
The disbarment process ordinarily is reserved for cases of extreme
professional misconduct, such as the theft of escrow funds,19 the utiliza-
tion of false or fraudulent documents,20 the commingling of funds21 or
conduct that has resulted in a criminal conviction.22 A hearing guaran-
teeing the putative defendant due process of law is mandatory in all cir-
cumstances involving acts that appear to reflect professional misconduct,
except in cases of felony conviction.23 New York State law automatically
and unilaterally requires an attorney's immediate disbarment the mo-
ment he is convicted of a felony,24 even though the vast majority of states
do not.25
This Article contends that automatic disbarment deprives an attor-
ney of due process, violates his Fifth Amendment rights, impinges his
right to equal protection of the law and, in essence, takes away his liveli-
hood and reputation without affording him a meaningful forum or realis-
tic opportunity to be heard. The drastic remedy of disbarment should
result only after a thorough and meaningful hearing, at which the alleg-
edly unethical attorney has a meaningful opportunity to present substan-
tial mitigating factors that might negate or reasonably explain the
felonious aspect of his conduct. In summary, the issue is not whether an
attorney should be disbarred because of a felonious act, but whether such
a drastic punishment should be administered automatically.
Although there are various degrees of felonies and types of behavior
that might constitute felonious acts, all felonies result in automatic dis-
barment under the New York statute.26 While certain felonies ultimately
should result in disbarment, other felonies are unrelated to the practice of
18. Disbarment leaves no literal black marks, but it permanently harms an attorney's
reputation.
19. See, eg., In re Pinello, 100 A.D.2d 64,473 N.Y.S.2d 7 (1984); In re Hodes, 97 A.D.2d
308, 469 N.Y.S.2d 371 (1983), appeal denied, 61 N.Y.2d 983, 463 N.E.2d 622, 475 N.Y.S.2d
281 (1984).
20. In re McComb, 93 A.D.2d 568, 462 N.Y.S.2d 683 (1983); In re Calm, 87 A.D.2d
1014, 449 N.Y.S.2d 239 (1981).
21. In re Rinaldi, 95 A.D.2d 211, 465 N.Y.S.2d 552 (1983); In re Warfman, 91 A.D.2d
356, 458 N.Y.S.2d 915 (1983).
22. In re Margiotta, 60 N.Y.2d 147, 456 N.E.2d 798, 468 N.Y.S.2d 857 (1983); In re
DeWindt, 93 A.D.2d 507, 462 N.Y.S.2d 223 (1983).
23. N.Y. JUD. LAW § 90 (McKinney 1983).
24. In re Barash, 20 N.Y.2d 154, 228 N.E.2d 896, 281 N.Y.S.2d 997 (1967); In re Gins-
berg, 1 N.Y.2d 144, 134 N.E.2d 193, 151 N.Y.S.2d 361 (1956).
25. The ABA Center for Professional Responsibility reports that only the State of New
York mandates the automatic disbarment of a lawyer upon conviction of a felony.
26. N.Y. JUD. LAW § 90.4 (McKinney 1983); see also In re Cahn, 52 N.Y.2d 479, 420
N.E.2d 945, 438 N.Y.S.2d 753 (1981); In re Chu, 42 N.Y.2d 490, 369 N.E.2d 1, 398 N.Y.S.2d
1001 (1977).
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law and are therefore inapposite to the distinct question of whether the
convicted individual is suited to practice law. For example, a lawyer
who is found guilty of perjury, suborning perjury, theft of clients' funds
or the use of false or fraudulent documents, should ordinarily be dis-
barred after a full and fair hearing. 7 Disbarment appears reasonable for
each of these felonies because they relate directly to the attorney's hon-
esty and the integrity of his legal practice.
On the other hand, the New York statute requires automatic disbar-
ment for felonies unrelated to the practice of law. In New York, a sec-
ond conviction for driving while intoxicated within ten years of the first
conviction constitutes a felony.28 Should an attorney be disbarred for
this conviction? An attorney's tendency to drink and drive has no direct
connection with his honesty or ability to practice law. To disbar the at-
torney automatically is to ignore such mitigating factors as, for example,
whether his drinking was predicated on the loss or suffering of a loved
one. The disease of alcoholism cannot be remedied by expelling an indi-
vidual from the legal profession.
Another example illustrative of the arbitrary and fundamentally un-
fair nature of automatic disbarment is felony assault conviction. In New
York, assault in the second degree constitutes a felony,2' but assault in
the third degree is a misdemeanor.30 The difference is that for a misde-
meanor, one must intend to cause physical injury, while for a felony, one
must intend to cause serious physical injury. With so hazy a distinction,
it may be that the status of the offense as a felony or misdemeanor will be
determined by the strength or weakness of the offender's plea bargaining.
Automatic disbarment does not take into account the circumstances of
the assault-was it an unprovoked fight in a bar or an aggravated neigh-
borhood dispute? Should a forced plea bargain determine whether the
allegedly unethical and unprofessional attorney will be afforded the pro-
tection of a hearing that preserves his basic due process rights?
In both instances sketched above, a hearing is necessary to afford
due process of law to an accused attorney, to discover the relevant facts
and circumstances and to determine whether the convicted individual is
capable of professionally and ethically performing his legal duties in the
future. The question is-are the vast majority of states that do not sanc-
tion automatic or mandatory disbarment incorrect in their solid respect
27. See, e.g., In re Stone, 80 A.D.2d 93, 437 N.Y.S.2d 682 (1981); In re Hirsch, 77 A.D.2d
267, 433 N.Y.S.2d 199 (1980); In re Mitchell, 48 A.D.2d 410, 370 N.Y.S.2d 99 (1975), affid,
40 N.Y.2d 153, 351 N.E.2d 743, 386 N.Y.S.2d 95 (1976).
28. N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. § 1192 (McKinney Supp. 1986).
29. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 120.05 (McKinney Supp. 1986).
30. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 120.00 (McKinney Supp. 1986).
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for basic constitutional principles and in their means of protecting the
citizenry? Or is New York, one of the few states that do prescribe auto-
matic disbarment,31 behind the times, acting in a Pavlovian, stare decisis
manner?
I. Automatic Disbarment Deprives Attorneys of Fundamental
Constitutional Guarantees
A. Due Process in Disbarment Proceedings
The United States Supreme Court has consistently held that legal
disciplinary actions "are adversary proceedings of a quasi-criminal na-
ture."32 Accordingly, the Court has concluded that "[d]isbarment,
designed to protect the public, is a punishment or penalty imposed on the
lawyer."33 Due to the fact that disciplinary proceedings are deemed to
be quasi-criminal in nature, it is "only fair and just that the Government
not subject any person to such a drastic divestment [of his livelihood]
without affording him substantial due process of law."
34
The Court has consistently and firmly held that the "power of the
States to control the practice of law cannot be exercised so as to abrogate
federally protected rights.' 35 For purposes of due process, an attorney
threatened with the penalty or punishment of disbarment because of a
felony conviction should be entitled to the same due process as a person
being tried in a criminal court for a crime. In a perceptive analysis of
dominant Supreme Court decisions in this area, the Second Circuit Court
of Appeals stated:
[A] court's disciplinary proceeding against a member of its bar is
comparable to a criminal rather than to a civil proceeding.... [I]t
cannot be disputed that for most attorneys the license to practice
law represents their livelihood, loss of which may be a greater pun-
ishment than a monetary fine. Furthermore, disciplinary measures
against an attorney, while posing a threat of incarceration only in
cases of contempt, may threaten another serious punishment-loss
of professional reputation. The stigma of such a loss can harm the
lawyer in his community and in his client relations as well as ad-
versely affect his ability to carry out his professional functions, par-
31. The few jurisdictions that mandate automatic disbarment in cases of felony conviction
include the District of Columbia, Mississippi and New York. D.C. CODE ANN. § 11-2503
(1981) (moral turpitude offenses); Miss. CODE ANN. § 73-3-41 (1972); N.Y. JUD. LAW § 90.4
(McKinney 1983).
32. E.g., In re Ruffalo, 390 U.S. 544, 551 (1968).
33. Id. at 550 (citations omitted).
34. In re Stroh, 97 Wash. 2d 289, 303, 644 P.2d 1161, 1169 (1982) (quoting In re Ming,
469 F.2d 1352, 1355 (7th Cir. 1972)), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1202 (1983).
35. Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483, 490 n.l1 (1969).
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ticulary if his branch of the law is trial practice. Undoubtedly
these factors played a part in leading the Supreme Court to charac-
terize disbarment proceedings as being of a 'quasi-criminal
nature'.36
Although federal and state courts are not united on the issue, for the
most part they have opined that attorney disciplinary proceedings must
comport with due process.37 Virtually any state encroachment upon
one's ability to pursue a profession or livelihood must satisfy the con-
tours of due process.3" In analogous circumstances, the United States
Supreme Court concluded that the automatic defrocking of a priest 39 for
aiding the Confederacy was impermissibly arbitrary.' The Court rea-
soned that one might have had different motives for aiding the Confeder-
acy-for example, out of love and loyalty to one's father. Similar
considerations moved the Court in Ex parte Garland41 to insist that an
attorney can be disbarred only "by the judgment of the court."'42 Thus,
the flexibility of the states, state bar associations and the courts in formu-
lating and executing disciplinary proceedings for attorneys is limited by
the Due Process Clause, which traditionally has been a safeguard against
arbitrary state action.4 3
For more than a century, the Supreme Court has expressly required
disciplinary proceedings to provide "that ... notice should be given to
the attorney of the charges made and opportunity afforded him for expla-
nation and defence."'  The Court has stated without qualification that
the state disbarment procedure must not suffer "from want of notice or
opportunity to be heard" if it is to comport with constitutionally man-
36. Erdmann v. Stevens, 458 F.2d 1205, 1209-10 (2d Cir.) (citations omitted), cert. denied,
409 U.S. 889 (1972).
37. In re Ming, 469 F.2d 1352 (7th Cir. 1972); In re Fleck, 419 F.2d 1040 (6th Cir. 1969),
cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1074 (1970); Chaney v. State Bar of Cal., 386 F.2d 962 (9th Cir. 1967),
cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1011 (1968); Hackin v. Lockwood, 361 F.2d 499 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
385 U.S. 960 (1966).
38. See Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964).
39. The automatic defrocking of a priest can easily be compared to the automatic disbar-
ment of an attorney.
40. Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall) 277 (1866).
41. 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333 (1866). In Garland, the statute involved was not a criminal
statute but one on all fours with New York's automatic disbarment provision. It was a Janu-
ary 24, 1865, Congressional enactment, which in effect, disbarred attorneys ex post facto, who
had aided the Confederacy. The Court held that the statute violated article I, section 9 of the
United States Constitution.
42. Id. at 379.
43. Ruffalo, 390 U.S. at 551-52; Selling v. Radford, 243 U.S. 46, 51 (1917).
44. Randall v. Brigham, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 523, 540 (1868).
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dated due process of law.45
Further, the Court has ruled that a state could not prevent the ad-
mission of an applicant to the Bar (which is no different in principle from
disbarring an attorney already admitted) except on the basis of evidence
sufficient "to raise substantial doubts about his present good moral char-
acter."46 The Court required a "record which rationally justifies a find-
ing that [the prospective attorney] was morally unfit to practice law."'
The Court explicitly held that "whether the practice of law is a 'right' or
a 'privilege,'" due process standards must be strictly upheld: "Regard-
less of how the State's grant of permission to engage in this occupation is
characterized, it is sufficient to say that a person cannot be prevented
from practicing except for valid reasons. Certainly the practice of law is
not a matter of the State's grace."4" Mr. Justice Frankfurter, in his con-
curring opinion, expressed the Court's rationale precisely: "Refusal to
allow a man to qualify himself for the profession on a wholly arbitrary
standard or on a consideration that offends the dictates of reason offends
the Due Process Clause."49
The United States Supreme Court has determined that disbarment
proceedings are "of a quasi-criminal nature"5" and that disbarment "is a
punishment or penalty imposed on the lawyer."51 It concomitantly con-
cluded that an attorney facing the possibility of disbarment "is accord-
ingly entitled to procedural due process, which includes fair notice of the
charge"52 as well as the opportunity to rebut the charges contained in a
disbarment petition.53
Automatic disbarment is an "inflexibly harsh rule" that sacrifices
fairness and reason, and one that brings about "abberational [sic] re-
45. Selling, 243 U.S. at 51. The Court in Selling stated it would not recognize a state
disbarment as binding if:
[F]rom an intrinsic consideration of the state record, one or all of the following con-
ditions should appear: 1, That the state procedure from want of notice or opportu-
nity to be heard was wanting in due process; 2, that there was such an infirmity of
proof as to facts found to have established the want of fair private and professional
character as to give rise to a clear conviction on our part that we could not consist-
ently with our duty accept as final the conclusion on that subject; or 3, that some
other grave reason existed which should convince us that to allow the natural conse-
quences of the judgment to have their effect would conflict with the duty which rests
upon us not to disbar except upon the conviction that, under the principles of right
and justice, we were constrained so to do.
46. Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232, 246 (1957).
47. Id. at 246-47.
48. Id. at 239 n.5.
49. Id. at 249 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
50. Ruffalo, 390 U.S. at 551.
51. Id. at 550.
52. Id.
53. Id.
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suits."'5 4 The authorities discussed above make it plain that an attorney
is entitled to a hearing before a court, to present evidence in mitigation
and explanation, and to have the penalty, if any, determined by the court
in light of the evidence-in short, due process. Automatic disbarment,
however, eliminates the safeguards necessary to preserve individual
rights. Illustrative of this proposition are two key federal cases dealing
directly with the violation of due process resulting from automatic dis-
barment of attorneys convicted of crimes. 5
In In re Ming, 6 the United States District Court summarily and
without a hearing suspended Ming from practicing before it because he
was convicted of failing to file federal income tax returns. Ming appealed
and the Seventh Circuit reversed the order of the district court, holding
that automatic suspension, without a hearing and without consideration
of matters in mitigation and explanation, violated due process.5 7 The
court stated:
As on an initial matter, we would not conceive that every Tom,
Dick and Harry of a misdemeanor would serve as a basis for sus-
pension. Secondarily, but conceivably of genuine significance,
there is the matter of the duration of the suspension. Extenuating
circumstances tending toward a minimization of the penalty very
probably would require a hearing for proper development. Re-
cently, in a case of parole revocation, the Supreme Court held that
the parolee had the right to a hearing, with minimum due process
requirements, including the opportunity to be heard in person and
to present evidence and to confront and cross-examine adverse wit-
nesses. While in a hearing on a suspension based on a finalized
conviction of a misdemeanor, an attorney may not be allowed to
reargue the merits of the conviction, he would seem to have similar
interests to those of the parolee, or a person being sentenced for a
crime, to some hearing under due process. In such a situation, 'a
chance to respond' must be equated to 'the opportunity to be
heard' which necessarily implies a hearing. 8
Ming's crime was a misdemeanor. The court specifically refused to ad-
dress disbarments based on felony convictions,59 nevertheless a person
convicted of a felony should be afforded the same rights.
In In re Jones,6 the Chief Judge of the United States District Court
54. In re Thies, 45 N.Y.2d 865, 867, 382 N.E.2d 1351, 1352, 410 N.Y.S.2d 575, 577
(1978) (Wachtler, Fuchsberg, Cooke, JI., dissenting).
55. In re Jones, 506 F.2d 527 (8th Cir. 1974); In re Ming, 469 F.2d 1352 (7th Cir. 1972).
56. 469 F.2d 1352 (7th Cir. 1972).
57. Id. at 1356.
58. Id. (citation omitted). The Court's rationale is at least equally applicable to disbar-
ment, if not more so.
59. Id. at 1355 n.2. Cf In re Echetes, 430 F.2d 347, 352 (7th Cir. 1970).
60. 506 F.2d 527, 528 (8th Cir. 1974).
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for the Eastern District of Arkansas made an order striking Jones' name
from the list of attorneys of that court upon Jones' conviction of filing
false income tax returns, a felony. The Chief Judge acted summarily,
without giving notice or a hearing, under a local rule similar to New
York's automatic disbarment statute.61 Jones appealed after a limited
post-disbarment hearing, and the Eighth Circuit reversed on the ground
that the lack of a meaningful hearing violated due process. The court
stated:
[W]e remand the case with instructions that Jones be permitted to
present any evidence of mitigation, etc., that he desires. In the
event the trial judge feels, after such a hearing, that the mitigating
circumstances are so compelling that disbarment was not appropri-
ate, he may then amend his judgment by ordering suspension or
such other penalty as is deemed appropriate under the
circumstances. 2
In jurisdictions that employ automatic disbarment, an attorney's fel-
ony conviction constitutes the predicate for the petition for his disbar-
ment. In essence, the conviction and the disbarment petition are handed
down simultaneously.6 The attorney is disbarred as of the moment of
his conviction," and "no further action, judicial or otherwise, is required
....,s65 Moreover, no consideration is given to the extent of the penalty
to be imposed.66 Disbarment is the automatic and immediate result.67
An attorney convicted of a felony has no real opportunity to be
heard.6' He has no opportunity to allege and prove mitigating circum-
stances concerning the offense, or its possible irrelevancy to the practice
of law.69 The respondent is denied the opportunity of presenting evi-
dence bearing on his past record or on his present character and fitness to
61. Id.
62. Id. at 529.
63. In re Barash, 20 N.Y.2d 154, 228 N.E.2d 896, 281 N.Y.S.2d 997 (1967); In re Gins-
berg, 1 N.Y.2d 144, 134 N.E.2d 193, 151 N.Y.S.2d 361 (1956).
64. Barash, 20 N.Y.2d at 157, 228 N.E.2d at 898, 281 N.Y.S.2d at 1000.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. N.Y. JUD. LAW § 90.4 (McKinney 1984).
68. An attorney convicted of a felony is entitled to a hearing in one situation only. This
opportunity arises only if his conviction was obtained in a federal or sister-state court. Under
such circumstances, the attorney could then allege that the wrongdoing does not comport with
the felony criminal statute of the petitioning state. In essence, therefore, the petitioner has the
mere duty of alleging that a felony conviction has occurred. Id. See In re Cahn, 52 N.Y.2d
479, 420 N.E.2d 945, 438 N.Y.S.3d 753 (1981); In re Chu, 42 N.Y.2d 490, 369 N.E.2d 1, 398
N.Y.S.2d 1001 (1977). But see In re Donegan, 282 N.Y. 285, 26 N.E.2d 260 (1940).
69. See In re Cahn 52 N.Y.2d 479, 420 N.E.2d 945, 438 N.Y.S.2d 753 (1981); In re Chu,
42 N.Y.2d 490, 369 N.E.2d 1, 398 N.Y.S.2d 1001 (1977); In re Barash, 20 N.Y.2d 154, 228
N.E.2d 896, 281 N.Y.S.2d 997 (1967); see also N.Y. JuD. LAW § 90.4 (McKinney 1983).
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practice law. The respondent is denied the opportunity to present evi-
dence bearing on the extent of the penalty to be imposed.7 ° Forgotten
are his accomplishments in the legal arena, his efforts to enhance and
improve our criminal justice system, and his pro bono represention of
impoverished clients. Irrelevant is his affiliation with various legal orga-
nizations whose objectives are the amelioration of the judicial process. 71
Customarily, staff members of disciplinary committees contend that
a disbarment hearing is both superfluous and unnecessary. 72 The basis of
their contention has been that the respondent has already had his "day-
in-court. ' 73 This argument is not merely imprecise, but it is fallacious
and unrealistic.
The primary aim of a criminal trial is to determine whether or not a
defendant has violated a penal statute. The prosecutor's goal is to prove
the defendant's guilt, while the defendant zealously attempts to prove
that he either did not commit the alleged criminal act or that the prose-
cution failed to prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The attor-
ney's ability to practice law is not at issue. Evidence of the attorney's
fitness of character, honesty or integrity may never arise.74 Moreover,
even if the attorney decides to put his character in issue, he is severely
hampered by the rules of evidence, which dictate that witnesses may only
testify as to character by offering reputation for honesty and veracity in
the community.75 The attorney is precluded from showing specific in-
stances of pro bono work, his creative legal draftsmanship or past effec-
tiveness in representing clients. 76 Thus, unless afforded a separate
hearing, these factors and any others relevant to an individual's profes-
sional and ethical capability to practice law are excluded from the con-
70. Barash, 20 N.Y.2d at 157, 228 N.E.2d at 898, 281 N.Y.S.2d at 1000.
71. Id.
72. Gentile & McShea, Automatic Disbarment: A Convicted Felon's Just Deserts, 13 HAS-
TINGS CONsT. L.Q. 433 (1986); Gentile, Unraveling the Complexity of Automatic Discipline,
N.Y.L.J., March 14, 1983, at 1, col. 3; Bonomi, Professional Responsibility: An Alternative to
Automatic Disbarment, N.Y.L.J., April 14, 1978, at 1, col. 1.
73. Gentile, supra note 72, at 1; see also Gentile & McShea, supra note 72, at 436.
74. See generally MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (1981). Lawyer con-
duct in the United States originally was governed by the Canons of Professional Ethics, which
were adopted by the American Bar Association (ABA) in 1908. ABA Comm. on Professional
Ethics and Grievances, Formal Ops. Foreword, at ix (1947). In 1969, a Model Code of Profes-
sional Responsibility was drafted and adopted by the ABA. ABA/BNA LAW. MANUAL ON
PROF. CONDUCT (BNA) 1:301 (1984) [hereinafter cited as Lawyers' Manual]. In August
1983, the ABA House of Delegates adopted the MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
(Rules), which replaced the entire Code. Lawyers' Manual, at 1:101 and 1:301. New York, in
1985, rejected the proposed Rules.
75. FED. R. EVID. 404-05.
76. Id.
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sideration of the court having jurisdiction to disbar the attorney.77
Consequently, an automatic disbarment statute, such as the one con-
tamined in Section 90.4 of the New York State Judiciary Law, proceeds on
the bare basis of a record of conviction.78
Not only does procedure hamper the attorney in his ability to pres-
ent evidence of character, but also tactical considerations may deny him
the opportunity to explain his conduct. In many cases, a defendant, al-
beit an attorney, does not even take the stand on his own behalf. This
strategy may be dictated by a number of factors. First and foremost is
the belief that the prosecution has failed to prove its case. Second, the
lawyer may just be a poor witness due to either demeanor, infirmity, al-
coholism, or other debilitating factors.
While an attorney should not be permitted to reargue the merits of
his criminal conviction in a disciplinary hearing, he must be permitted to
come forth during a fair and impartial hearing with pertinent and rele-
vant factors which he could not, or chose not, to bring forth during the
criminal adjudication. As the Supreme Court of the United States pro-
nounced more than one century ago:
All that is requisite to [the state's disbarment proceeding's] validity
is that, when not taken for matters occurring in open court [i.e.,
misconduct], in the presence of the judges, notice should be given
to the attorney of the charges made and opportunity afforded him
for explanation and defence.79
The Court of Appeals, in In re Ming, convincingly argued that the
phrase "notice and opportunity to be heard" forbids summary disbar-
ment for conviction of a crime:
Both licenses to practice law and welfare payments can be viewed
as a type of "new property," the deprivation of which has drastic
consequences to the individual. It is only fair and just that the
Government not subject any person to such a drastic divestment
without affording him substantial due process of law. As the
Supreme Court noted in Goldberg v. Kelly, required procedural
safeguards depend on the particular characteristics of the partici-
pants and the controversy, but "'[t]he fundamental requisite of
due process of law is the opportunity to be heard.'"
"In almost every setting where important decisions turn on
questions of fact, due process requires an opportunity to confront
and cross-examine adverse witnesses."8
77. Id. See Barash, 20 N.Y.2d at 157, 228 N.E.2d at 898, 281 N.Y.S.2d at 1000.
78. See supra notes 63-67 and accompanying text.
79. Randall v. Brigham, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 523, 540 (1868).
80. In re Ming, 469 F.2d 1352, 1355-56 (7th Cir. 1972) (citations omitted); see also, In re
Crane, 23 Ill.2d 398, 400-01, 178 N.E.2d 349, 350 (1961).
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The disbarment of an attorney is statutory and requires no judicial
consideration.81 Thus, an attorney subject to automatic disbarment
never truly receives "notice" of his punishment before its imposition. 2
In fact, he is summarily disbarred as of the date of his conviction without
having had the opportunity to present evidence on his own behalf.
B. Equal Protection
In his outstanding article on the constitutional infirmities and basic
unfairness of the automatic disbarment remedy, John G. Bonomi, s3 one
of the foremost experts on professional discipline in the State of New
York, concluded that virtually all licensed professionals in New York
who are convicted of felonies are guaranteed meaningful hearings that
comport with due process of law. These hearings examine the substan-
tive facts of the alleged misconduct and allow the convicted professionals
the opportunity to fully present evidence of mitigating circumstances.8 4
It is most ironic that attorneys are only afforded a meaningful and just
forum when representing such licensed professionals as doctors, engi-
neers, architects, and even hot dog vendors who are the targets of disci-
plinary action. Attorneys are permitted to champion the due process
rights of their clients, yet, in an almost Kafka-esque scenario, the very
champions of due process are denied the enjoyment of the rights and
benefits they so strenuously safeguard for others. It is a violation of the
equal protection doctrine to afford due process to the majority of profes-
sionals, but not to attorneys.
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment re-
quires states not to discriminate between persons similarly situated unless
there is a reasonable, nonarbitrary basis for treating them differently."5
The state's classifications may be overturned if they are not rationally
related to legitimate state interests.8 6 The courts apply strict scrutiny to
any state action involving a fundamental right 7 or a suspect class. 8
Whether deferentially or strictly reviewed, automatic disbarment violates
the Equal Protection Clause.
81. See supra notes 63-69.
82. See Jones, 506 F.2d at 528.
83. Bonomi, Professional Responsibility: An Alternative to Automatic Disbarment,
N.Y.L.J., Apr. 14, 1978, at 1, col. 1.
84. Id. at 4, col. 3.
85. F.S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920).
86. See City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303-04 (1976).
87. That is, a right implied by the Constitution. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S.
618 (1969) (right to travel).
88. Race is one example of a suspect classification. See, e.g., Avery v. Georgia, 345 U.S.
559 (1953).
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Arguably, automatic disbarment should be subject to close judicial
review. When fundamental rights are at issue, discriminatory state ac-
tions are subject to strict scrutiny.89 Although the courts have not yet
gone so far as to hold that an individual's right to work automatically
triggers strict scrutiny equal protection review, it is clear that the right to
earn a livelihood is a fundamental personal freedom protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment.9" The importance of that right is underscored
by the fact that some courts have held that the right of an attorney to
practice law is a vested right.9 Automatic disbarment deprives an attor-
ney of that right to earn a living without affording him due process of law
and some form of heightened review sould be appropriate under equal
protection analysis.92
Even under the more relaxed rational relation test, automatic dis-
barment violates equal protection. There is no rational basis for denying
attorneys the right enjoyed by other professionals to a full and fair disci-
plinary hearing in connection with felony convictions. Some have argued
that attorneys as officers of the court are similar to public officials, and
are therefore subject to automatic expulsion from the bar for unethical
conduct.93 The United States Supreme Court, however, has refused to
accept the characterization of an attorney as an officer of the government
89. Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 638.
90. Takahashi v. Fish and Game Comm'n, 334 U.S. 410, 415-16 (1948).
91. In re Levine, 97 Ariz. 88, 90-91 (1964); In re Schaengold, 83 Nev. 65, 68-69 (1967).
Contra Sams v. Olah, 225 Ga. 497, 504-05 (1969); Iowa State Bar Ass'n v. Kraschel, 260 Iowa
187, 193 (1967); People v. Culkin, 248 N.Y. 465, 470 (1924).
92. It may be argued that by denying attorneys due process, New York has made them an
unprotected special class. In In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717 (1973), the United States Supreme
Court deemed the wholesale classification of aliens as unfit to practice law in the State of
Connecticut as violative of the Equal Protection Clause. The resident alien seeking admission
to the bar was married to an American citizen and was a graduate of an American law school.
The Court stated that violation of the Equal Protection Clause occurs unless the state shows
"that its purpose or interest is both constitutionally permissible and substantial, and that its
use of the classification is 'necessary... to the accomplishment' of its purpose or the safe-
guarding of its interest." Id. at 721-22 (citations omitted). The Court rejected Connecticut's
overbroad contention that an alien has unclear national loyalties that may undermine his abil-
ity to serve the court system or his clients. Id. at 723-24. The Court also refused to accept the
State's characterization of an attorney as an officer of the government subject to the special
qualifications imposed on individuals, particularly aliens, in the governmental process. The
Court required Connecticut to cease its broad exclusion of aliens from the practice of law, and
held that the State must make reasonable determinations on an individual case basis in order to
comport with the standards of the Equal Protection Clause. Id. at 722-23. Similarly, sweeping
disbarment of every attorney convicted of a felony denies them even the semblance of due
process and transforms them into a special class of unprotected individuals.
93. People v. Culkin, 248 N.Y. 465, 162 N.E. 487 (1928); 21 ALB. L. REv. 100, 102
(1957).
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subject to special qualification.94 The discrimination cannot be justified
by arguing that an attorney as a fiduciary should be held to a higher
standard. First, there may be no connection between the underlying con-
viction and an attorney's trustworthiness. Secondly, many other profes-
sionals are also fiduciaries. It is unreasonable to differentiate between
these professionals and attorneys.
Unlike virtually any other licensed professional, attorneys are sum-
marily disbarred as soon as they are convicted of a felony, without even a
cursory hearing. There is no opportunity to determine the facts and cir-
cumstances surrounding the attorney's conviction, let alone the nexus, if
any, between his conviction and the capability to practice his chosen pro-
fession. As Mr. Bonomi concluded, this situation "constitutes separate
and unequal treatment [which is] violative of the [E]qual [P]rotection
[C]lause of the United States and New York Constitutions.""
C. Due Process and Fifth Amendment Concerns in Criminal Proceedings
Application of automatic disbarment hinders an attorney not only in
the disciplinary setting, but also in his defense of the predicate criminal
action. An attorney who is charged with a felony, justifiably or not, is
under severe pressure to take a plea to either a misdemeanor or petty
offense. This is due to the fact that a zealous attempt to defend himself
against the felony accusation may result in both conviction and auto-
matic disbarment. This dilemma has a significant chilling effect on the
attorney's defense. Recognizing that jurors are unpredictable and often
unsympathetic to lawyers accused of crime, the attorney in quest of pres-
ervation of his career may well forego his day in court rather than risk
conviction. Further, as explained above,96 evidentiary rules preclude the
attorney from submitting his professional qualifications, past pro bono
work and other activities that would substantially negate the assertion
that he is unfit to practice law. A plea to a misdemeanor or a petty
offense at least will ensure him of a hearing at which he can introduce
mitigating factors and meaningful character testimony as to his ability to
practice law.97 The irrefutable effect of automatic disbarment is that a
lawyer may forfeit his profession if he chooses to fully exercise his consti-
tutional privilege to defend himself in court, or he may be forced to sacri-
fice his privilege to retain his livelihood. Consequently, even the integrity
of the criminal adjudication is substantially eviscerated by the automatic
94. In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717, 723 (1973).
95. Bonomi, supra note 83, at 4, col. 3 (citations omitted).
96. See supra notes 69, 75 and accompanying text.
97. N.Y. JUD. LAW § 90 (McKinney 1983).
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disbarment approach. An attorney is placed in a Hobson's Choice-he
can neither focus on the criminal trial nor can he adequately safeguard
his reputation and integrity.
Ironically, the rights essentially denied to an attorney in a criminal
adjudication in an automatic disbarment jurisdiction are guaranteed to
him in a disciplinary proceeding. The United States Supreme Court, in
Spevack v. Klein, 9' reviewed the disbarment of a New York attorney
who refused to produce records or to testify at a judicial inquiry. In
reaffirming the principle that the Fourteenth Amendment includes the
Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination,99 the Court held
that the privilege extends to lawyers in disbarment proceedings. 1°° The
Court explicitly found any penalty for invoking the Fifth Amendment,
including disbarment, impermissible.101
In reality, the attorney faced with a felony adjudication in an auto-
matic disbarment jurisdiction does not enjoy such protection. If he de-
cides to go to trial to fight the felony charge, he almost certainly has to
testify. If he chooses not to testify, the odds of conviction, and therefore
automatic disbarment, are substantially raised. Further, an attorney
truly innocent of any offense may be forced to accept a reduced charge in
order to guarantee a disciplinary hearing rather than risk conviction and
the loss of an opportunity to explain. Consequently, a reasonable alter-
native to automatic disbarment must be adopted.
II. Fairness and Fundamental Constitutional Safeguards
Mandate Alternatives to Automatic Disbarment
The American Bar Assocktion Model Rules," 2 addressing attorney
discipline, provide safeguards that are absent from automatic punish-
ment systems. A model system would provide for a hearing whereby
mitigating circumstances may be introduced whenever an attorney is
subjected to discipline following his conviction of a crime. This hearing
would be designed to afford an individual clear notice of the charge that
he is unfit to practice law, along with a warning of his possible punish-
ment. Most critically, it would provide the attorney with a genuine op-
portunity to introduce evidence in explanation and mitigation.
Three decades ago, California amended its Business and Profes-
98. 385 U.S. 511 (1967).
99. Id. at 514.
100. Id. at 514-15.
101. Id.
102. See A.B.A. Standing Comm. on Prof. Discipline Suggested Guidelines for Rules of
Disciplinary Enforcement (1974).
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sional Code to eliminate summary disbarment.10 3 Among the key
changes was the insertion of language in the statute which requires disci-
pline to be determined "according to the gravity of the crime and the
circumstances of the case."" In an early and influential opinion, the
California Supreme Court observed that such reform is not intended to
emasculate professional standards, but to ensure discipline based on the
particular facts of each case:
No intent of the Legislature to lessen professional standards can be
derived either from the wording or legislative history of the 1955
amendments. Sponsored by the State Bar, the amendments give
greater flexibility and in substance (a) affirm this court's estab-
lished policy of referring cases where the question of moral turpi-
tude was doubtful upon the record of conviction to the State Bar
for hearing, report and recommendation; (b) provide a means of
obtaining a better record than provided under the former law by
the bare 'record of conviction' (which consists of indictment, infor-
mation or complaint, plea of guilty and other minute orders); (c)
permit disciplinary investigation where the crime itself does not
involve moral turpitude; (d) remove the legislative mandate that
disbarment is mandatory upon the final conviction of any crime
involving moral turpitude; and (e) permit this court to take into
account unusual situations even in the case of more serious
crimes. 105
This model should be adopted by the states that currently authorize
automatic or mandatory disbarment. Among the relevant factors such a
hearing should focus upon are: (1) the nature of the offense; (2) the prior
reputation of the convicted attorney for honesty and veracity; (3) the
nexus between the crime and competency to practice law effectively; (4)
the attorney's prior professional record; (5) his pro bono service to the
community; and (6) his potential for rehabilitation.
If these factors are adopted, the appropriate courts could decide
whether an attorney should be disbarred "on the foundation of a hearing
in mitigation and explanation, rather than on the bare record of convic-
tion, [and] may impose a penalty for the crime and circumstances of the
103. 1939 Cal. Stat., ch. 34, p. 357.
California laws pertaining to disbarment have undergone some change recently. Califor-
nia permits "summary" disbarment of attorneys convicted of certain kinds of felonies. Sum-
mary disbarment felonies are those that have as an element some sort of intent to deceive or
steal, and that are committed in the practice of law. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6102(c)
(West Supp. 1986). Though such disbarment is labeled "summary," it remains to be seen
whether the California courts will require a hearing to determine whether the felony was com-
mitted in connection with the practice of law.
104. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6102(b) (West 1955).
105. In re Smith, 67 Cal. 2d 460, 462, 432 P.2d 231, 232, 62 Cal. Rptr. 615, 616 (1967)
(citations omitted).
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case." 1
0 6
Conclusion
Automatic disbarment based on a felony conviction is a drastic rem-
edy. For all intents and purposes, disbarment terminates the legal career
of an attorney. In addition, once disbarred the individual attorney is
stigmatized for the remainder of his life in whatever job or profession he
ultimately accepts. He loses the opportunity to practice law-an oppor-
tunity that is only gained via years of preparation and hard work.
It is by no means contended that dishonest or disreputable attorneys
should be kept on the rolls. An attorney who has violated his fiduciary
trust vis-a-vis his clients or has acted in a manner that clearly subverts
our legal system should be removed. The traditional dual concern of
safeguarding the public and deterring other lawyers from committing un-
lawful and unethical acts should be maintained. However, the cost of
policing the legal profession and protecting the public should not be the
evisceration of the very constitutional rights that the legal profession
zealously seeks to preserve. A hearing wherein an attorney is afforded an
opportunity to mitigate the charges against him and to put forth his past
record will not necessarily permit him the unrestricted right to practice
law. Rather, instead of disbarment, the appropriate penalty may well be
suspension if and when a prognosis of rehabilitation appears likely.
To deny an individual the opportunity to salvage his career by show-
ing that the conduct in question was a mere aberration in an otherwise
fruitful and law abiding life violates not only the dictates of the Constitu-
tion, but the very principles of fundamental fairness on which our soci-
ety's ethics rest. Moreover, even the grossest offender is entitled at least
to a hearing to determine the degree of his wrongdoing. In a sense, de-
nial of due process to attorneys found to have violated the law is as un-
seemly as the conduct, whatever it might be, of which these attorneys are
convicted. Denial of constitutional rights and privileges, both in the
criminal and ethical arena, must be accompanied by the requisite due
process standard which affords a hearing prior to dismissal from the legal
profession. Anything less leaves all attorneys stained with the mark of a
system that condones punishment without due and fair process.
106. Bonomi, supra note 83, at 4, col. 6.
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